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Abstract 
 
The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard is a set of twelve security 
requirements applicable to all institutions and systems handling, storing or 
transmitting cardholder information. It was created by the main card brands in a 
united effort to respond to the increasing number of attacks and data breaches cases 
targeted and linked to card and cardholder data. The standard considers points such 
as policies design, data security, network architecture, software design, application 
security, transmission encryption requirements and so on. Being compliant with the 
standard can be both expensive and traumatic for any business willing to do it. This 
research analyzes the impact that this compliance achievement process can have on an 
enterprise. This work is focused on the networking infrastructure and security and 
application security in general. This is a case study based on a real situation, where 
real current procedures and implementations were evaluated against the standard 
requirements regarding networking design, security and applications security. This 
will provide a benchmark of the situation towards getting the compliance validation in 
the company subject of this case study.    
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1. Introduction 
 
Credit cards have become a very common way to handle money transactions around 
the globe.  The amount of credit cards being issued keeps going up each year. We have 
gone a long way since the emission of the first credit card in 1958 (Woolsey & Schulz, 
2010). In the USA by June 30, 2009 Visa had 309 million credit cards circulating; 
Master Card 211 million by September 30, 2009; American Express 54 million by 
December 31, 2008 and Discover 57.1 million by the same year (Woolsey & Schulz, 
2010). From those numbers it can be inferred a total estimate of 631.1 million credit 
cards were spread all over the country by the end of 2009. Extending those numbers to 
the globe, and considering debit cards, probably we would be talking about billions of 
cards doing billions of transactions each day.  
 
Card numbers have always been a temptation for delinquents; cardholder’s data 
(name, account number, pin) is very useful information for identity theft purposes and 
a cloned credit card can give a vandal immediate money to spend without being notice 
for a while.  
 
Credit card information and cardholder’s data can be illegally collected from several 
sources such as: garbage, mailboxes, personal records on a hospital or at your 
workplace, electronically stolen from e-commerce sites, through phishing or with the 
use of hacking techniques targeted to databases of any company that is known to 
handle credit card information (Obringer, 2002).   
 
Early in the past decade electronic frauds and hacking techniques started giving 
serious headaches and represent big losses to companies of all sizes. In 2007 TJX 
Companies Inc. reported a data breach compromising more than 45 million credit and 
debit card data; at that moment it was considered the biggest data breach ever 
(Bosworth, 2007). Before that, in 2005, CardSystems Solutions a payment processor 
had an intrusion that was presumed having compromised about 40 million credit card 
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numbers (Krazit, 2005).  More recently in 2009, Network Solutions had an incident 
were about 573,000 debit and credit cards accounts were compromised (Krebs, 2009) 
while HeartLand Payments Systems had a data breach case, also in 2009, even though 
they alleged no card data was compromised.   It is possible to continue citing cases like 
these for another couple of paragraphs, but it is enough to illustrate the idea, that 
those incidents were part of the driving factors (along with disclosure laws and some 
other particular situations) on the development of enhanced security requirements 
and standards.  
 
Some years ago before PCI DSS different card brands had made their individual efforts 
on security initiatives; Visa developed the Cardholder Information Security Program 
(CISP) and the Account Information Security (AIS) while MasterCard created the Site 
Data Protection Program (SDP)(Gorge, 2006); American Express had the (DSS) Data 
Security Standards and Discover Card –(DISC) the Discover Card Information 
Security and Compliance (Security Assessment, 2007).  
 
Paradoxically, data breaches incidents like those mentioned above  made the Payment 
Card Industry major representatives think that  the security topic needed to be 
addressed as a joint effort in order to make it work.  The idea was involving all 
stakeholders in the protection of their most important assets: cards and cardholder 
data. That is how the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) was 
born.  The main card brands (American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB 
International, MasterCard Worldwide and Visa Inc. International) formed the PCI 
Security Standards Council that later would release the PCI DSS standard on its first 
version.  
 
The standard attempts to be a guide on how to approach data security for companies 
handling credit card transactions in order to minimize the risks of data breaches, 
identity theft and frauds related to cardholders’ data. However getting stakeholders 
complying with the standard has not been an easy road, and actually represents a 
transforming process for every company affected by it, worth of a case study.  
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The following document contains documentation on a case of study about the PCI DSS 
compliance process for a Dominican financial institution and the impact it has had on 
its network designing and technological infrastructure security. 
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2. Antecedents 
 
2.1. What is it about? 
 
PCI DSS is a Security Standard. Its objective is to protect cardholder data. Its 
requirements should be applied on any system, server and/or network containing this 
type of data. Cardholder data includes: PAN: Principal Account Number or Card 
Number, Cardholder Name, Card Expiration Date, Service Code, Sensitive 
Authentication Data: Full magnetic stripe data, CAV2/CVC2/CVV2/CID1 and 
PINs/PIN blocks. “The Primary Account Number (PAN) is the defining factor in the 
applicability of PCI DSS requirements and PA-DSS2. If PAN is not stored, processed, 
or transmitted, PCI DSS and PA-DSS do not apply (PCI Security Standards Council 
LLC, 2008)” 
 
The vast majority of financial institutions (or any institution affected by the standard) 
do not possess a whole infrastructure or resources exclusively dedicated to handle card 
transactions and cardholders’ data thus in most cases, not to say in all of them, PCI 
DSS requirements will affect the entire technological infrastructure and organization; 
that is the reason why this standard supposes such a big impact on the institutions 
willing to comply with it. 
 
PCI DSS establishes the following twelve requirements: 
 
Build and Maintain a Secure Network  
Requirement 1: Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder 
data.  
                                     
1 See Glossary 
2 Payment Application Data Security Standard 
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Requirement 2: Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other 
security parameters. 
Protect Cardholder Data 
Requirement 3: Protect stored cardholder data. 
Requirement 4: Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks  
Maintain a Vulnerability Management Program 
Requirement 5: Use and regularly update anti-virus software or programs 
Requirement 6: Develop and maintain secure systems and applications  
Implement Strong Access Control Measures 
Requirement 7: Restrict access to cardholder data by business need-to-know 
Requirement 8: Assign a unique ID to each person with computer access 
Requirement 9: Restrict physical access to cardholder data  
Regularly Monitor and Test Networks   
Requirement 10: Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder 
data  
Requirement 11: Regularly test security systems and processes  
Maintain an Information Security Policy  
Requirement 12: Maintain a policy that addresses information security for employees 
and contractors. 
 
But, how such common sense directives can be so difficult to achieve? Some of the 
problems come with the sizes of the companies and the comprehension of the standard 
as well.  Sometimes, misconception of the requirements leads to major difficulties on 
implementations. 
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2.2. Who is the target? 
PCI DSS applies to any merchants, service providers, and financial institutions that 
handle, store, process or transmit cardholder data (Bradley, et al., 2007).  Merchants 
are defined as any company that receives a card payment in exchange of a good or 
service. Service Providers are companies that process, store or transmit cardholder 
data; they might serve merchants or other service providers (Bradley, et al., 2007). 
The standard classifies members, merchants, and service providers into different 
levels according to the number of transactions they handle. The classification also 
defines diverse compliance validation procedures and who is responsible for validating 
the compliance.  
Table 1 – Compliance validation summary Table for merchants (www.ncsu.edu, 
2005)(Bitter, 2009) (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2009) 
Merchant 
Level 
Description Compliance Validation Validated By 
1 More than 6,000,000 annual 
credit card transactions; 
Global Merchants identified as 
level 1 by any Visa region; 
 or  
Any merchant that has 
suffered an attack causing 
account data to be 
compromised 
 
Any business classified as 
level one by any other credit 
card company. 
 
Annual On-site data security 
audit;  
Quarterly Network Scan 
Annual external/internal  
Penetration tests 
 
Qualified Independent 
security assessor; or 
Internal audit 
Approved Scanning vendor 
(ASV) 
2 1,000,000 to 6,000,000 
annual transactions 
Annual self-assessment;  
Quarterly Network Scan 
Annual external/internal  
Penetration tests 
 
Merchant; 
Approved Scanning Vendor 
(ASV) 
3 20K to 1,000,000 transactions 
per year 
Annual self-assessment;  
Quarterly Network Scan 
Annual external/internal  
Penetration tests 
 
Merchant; 
Approved Scanning Vendor 
(ASV) 
4 Less than 20K annual 
transaction (Visa Credit Card 
e-commerce transactions) 
Less than 1,000,000 
traditional Visa credit card 
transactions.  
Annual self-assessment 
(recommended); 
Quarterly Network Scan 
(recommended) 
Merchant; 
Approved Scanning Vendor 
(ASV) 
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Service Provider Level Description Compliance Validation 
1 More than 300,000 annual 
transactions 
Annual On-site data security audit;  
Quarterly Network Scan  
2 Less than 300,000 annual 
transactions 
Annual self-assessment Questionnaire 
(SAQ);  
Quarterly Network Scan 
 
 
2.3. Some History  
 
PCI DSS was settled as mandatory back in 2004. The latest compliance dates were 
established for 2007. (Miller). In 2005 several USA major (and minor) retailers and 
card processors were victims of data breaches incidents that exposed millions of credit 
card numbers and cardholders confidential information.  
According to data contained in the Chronology of Data Breaches (Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 2010), provided by the privacy rights Clearinghouse from the United 
States with data compiled from incidents within that country, a total of 345,124,400 
records containing sensitive personal information were affected by security breaches 
in the USA since January 2005 to February 2010. Those breaches occurred on several 
different entities: universities, hospitals, Stores, banks and other financial institutions.  
 
According to the ITRC (Identity Theft Resource Center, 2008), who keeps statistics on 
data breaches cases, in 2005 there was a “total of 158 disclosed incidents, potentially 
affecting more than 64.8 million individuals plus 20 undisclosed victim group 
populations” (ITRC, 2006); While in 2006 (ITRC, 2007) “At least 312 incidents have 
been disclosed, potentially affecting more than 19 million individuals:  30% of 
disclosures involve governmental or military agencies; 28%, educational institutions; 
21%, general business; 13%, health care facilities or companies; and 8%, banking, 
credit or financial services entities”.   
 
In 2007 (ITRC, 2008) there were 446 incidents and 127,725,343 records were exposed  
(although a record does not necessarily mean an individual because multiple records 
might be bound to only one individual, this is still a high number). The incidents were 
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distributed under the following categories:  Medical/Healthcare 14.6%, 
Government/Military 24.7%, Educational 24.9%, General Business 28.9%, 7.0% 
Banking/Credit/Financial.  
 
In 2009 (ITRC, 2010) a total of 498 breaches incidents were reported with 
222,477,043 records exposed. The breaches corresponded to: Medical/Healthcare 
13.7%, Government/Military 18.1%, Educational 15.7%, General Business 41.2%, 
Banking/Credit/Financial 11.4%.  For 2010 so far there have been reported 35 
breaches affecting 1,422,304 records.  
According to Tech//404 Data Loss Calculator (Allied World Assurance Company, 
2006) a security incident where 1000 records are compromised can cost a company an 
average of US$ 199, 526.00. Imagine cases as the ones contained in the reports 
mentioned above with numbers of records compromised as large as 2,900,000 records 
have been compromised (ITRC, 2007). 
 
Credit card brands are aware of the fact that compromised data can cost a lot of 
money; this is especially true for card/cardholders data. They are also conscious that 
data breaches can turn into identity theft cases affecting the reputation of their 
industry. This is especially harmful since the industry could lose plenty of its gains if 
people start thinking that credit cards are not a safe way to handle their finances. 
 
In order to minimize the risk of having card/cardholder data compromised, losing a 
lot of money and damaging a reputation, it is necessary to implement comprehensive 
security measures on the systems and environment where this data resides.  It is also 
necessary to make everybody in the card payment business knowing of the need for 
collaboration and engagement with security on the infrastructure handling 
card/cardholder information.  That is how PCI DSS came into the scenario.  
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2.4. PCI DSS Compliance Validation 
 
In order to complete PCI DSS requirements companies can hire a Qualified Security 
Assessor (QSA) who is authorized to provide both assessment and guidance to 
institutions willing to comply with the standard. VISA certifies that QSAs are well 
trained and can assist a business on their road toward compliance. However hiring a 
QSA is not as easy as just thinking you need one and calling asking for their services.  
 
Having a QSA can cost you a lot of money depending on the size of the company and 
the range of services you are requiring from this QSA. Those services can include 
several things such as: an initial assessment to evaluate in which stage the institution 
is positioned on the road to compliance, or how much will be needed to change, 
evaluate or invest in order to achieve the compliance. Also, this QSA might be the 
person responsible of completing your Report On Compliance (ROC).  
 
The Report On Compliance is sort of an assessment form that is completed either for 
evaluation purposes or to be sent to the proper authorities stating that your business is 
considered to be in compliance with the standard and can be evaluated at any 
moment.   There is another type of assessment filled out to validate compliance the 
Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAC). 
 
The difference between Report On Compliance and a Self-Assessment Questionnaire is 
that while the Report On Compliance is a document filled by institutions that must be 
validated by the brands, the Self-Assessment Questionnaire (valid to certify 
compliance of level 3 merchants) is an evaluation that does not need to be validated by 
any third party.  
 
Why would it be necessary to hire a QSA in order to receive guidance to be compliant 
with this standard? Getting PCI DSS compliance is more than just a project. It is a 
whole transformation process, and as any process there could be resistance to start 
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working on it. This resistance might be due to several reasons such as:  an insufficiency 
of resources, including money, time and personnel to complete the tasks that are 
supposed to be executed in order to be compliant with the standard.  That is why some 
help from an outsider is not only welcomed but also required, even if it costs you a lot.   
 
Another factor considered is that setting down PCI DSS compliance in any company is 
not only about reading the documents provided by VISA, and filling a checklist. It is 
more about adapting the statements settled by the standard to the reality of the 
enterprise in a manner that allows evaluating accurately the technological 
infrastructure status and changes required to achieve compliance.  
 
The decision from a company of having a QSA or a QSAC to help them during the 
procedure or to do it by themselves will strongly depend on the amount of resources 
the company can destine to achieve PCI DSS compliance.  If a company understands 
that it has capable personnel that can complete the requirements and is willing to 
assign PCI DSS as an internal project to that personnel under complete assurance that 
they can lead the project and execute all the required activities, it is fine designate that 
personnel with the task of getting each PCI DSS requirement revised and done 
omitting the assistance of a QSA (or QSAC).  This is not the most common approach, 
but it might be successful as well and even cheaper. Almost every company seeks for 
assistance, because they find themselves overwhelmed with all the things that come up 
from a process of this magnitude.  
 
2.5. Network Design and PCI DSS Impact 
 
As we know a company does not necessarily emerge with an understandable idea on 
how their technological infrastructure will be implemented, at least in this country 
(Dominican Republic). Even when they do have clear network design in mind, they 
eventually grow and have major or minor changes that affect their initial designing.  
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An organization might completes all the steps since the initial phase in order to create 
their technological platform or they can just accommodate to the situation and recycle 
or reuse existing elements if it comes that they are getting part or their total 
installations from somebody else.   
 
The financial Institution selected for this case study is a relatively young one. It is an 
organization which network and infrastructure deployment was not previously 
designed and conceived from scratch. They inherited their physical installations and 
part of its technological infrastructure from other financial institutions that used to 
run their operations in the same physical place where this latest institution currently 
works. This means that the networking designing process has not been actually a 
“designing process”.  It has been more an adaptation process. Their implementations 
were created responding to necessities and evolved precisely because of those 
necessities.  
 
As any adaptation/evolution process it is understandable that several things are not 
actually on the place they should be. However, it is the responsibility of the team 
handling equipments, applications and installations to either improve the things they 
have inherited or just completely change them and turn it into what they need them to 
be.  This is pretty much the process that this company is currently going through. And 
not only to introduce enhancements on the infrastructure they got from the past, but 
also to introduce a well planned security schema suitable to achieve PCI DSS 
compliance status. 
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3. Motivation and Scope 
 
The objective of this case study is to evaluate how the adoption of a security Standard 
can impact the network design and the security infrastructure.   The entire Dominican 
Market is facing the experience of getting PCI DSS Compliance. This standard was 
created back in 2004, by that time there was not a real attention or interest to respond 
to the standard requirements from the affected business in Dominican Republic 
(neither in USA or Europe). Also, since the standard was new, brands were not in the 
position of pushing that hard to make organizations compliant. Last years the story 
has changed. More and more card industry stakeholders including banks, merchants, 
service providers and issuers are working to get the compliance.  
 
September 30th 2010 is the latest date globally (except for Europe) to achieve 
compliance for any enterprise handling, storing or processing card transactions.  If 
decide not to be compliant with the standard they can be fined and eventually lose the 
right to do business with card brands. The Security Standard Council and the brands 
themselves are pushing hard to get everybody to be in compliant status.  
 
The current Case study is related to PCI DSS and this standard covers different areas 
such as policies design, security approach, network architecture, software Design, 
application security, transmission encryption requirements and so on.  This work will 
be focused only in the network designing activities and changes and the security 
schema for applications. Of course, if this activities are related to cards or cardholder 
environment, because PCI DSS its only applicable to those cases. 
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4. Methods, Materials and Procedures 
 
The information presented on the following report was gathered by performing 
interviews with people working in the technology and security areas. Names of the 
participants of the interviews had been hidden for confidentiality purposes. During 
those interviews questions regarding to the design of the network and the original 
infrastructure diagrams from a couple of years ago were made. 
 
There was a recompilation of existent documentation to know which things were 
already implemented and established regarding documentation requirements. Tests3 
on the field were also performed to validate the truthfulness of the information 
provided by the interviewed personnel. 
 
Participants Materials 
Networking Administrators Level 1 
and Level 24 
Security Administrators Level 1 and 
Level 2 
Application Developers 
System Users 
 
Policies 
Network diagrams 
Configuration procedures 
Application development documentation 
PCI DSS project complete documentation 
Configuration Files 
 
 
Procedure 
 
Review Network Designs and configuration files.   
Discuss information with personnel of the networking and security areas.   
Execute activities to prove the affirmations of participants.  
Policies revision and discussion with affected users.  
 
                                     
3 Details on this activities has been omitted as required for confidentiality purposes 
4 A higher number level means technical positions, while a lower number means a management position 
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Answer for the following questions were found along the development of this research 
for the company subject of the case study (it will be called Company X in the following 
paragraphs): 
 
• Complete inventory of the changes made in the last years. 
• The driving factors leading to those changes. Which of them were actually made 
because of PCI DSS. 
• Which of them contribute to PCI DSS even if they were not initially made to 
comply with the standard.  
• What is the effect of those changes/new implementations to make the 
infrastructure PCI DSS compliant?  
• Analysis whether the changes can be accepted as well implementations for PCI 
DSS by a QSA /QSAC or by the brands.  
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5. Case Study Scenario 
 
The organization featured on this case study is a national financial institution offering 
multiple services for customers of different categories: single individuals, small and 
medium enterprises, government, and so on.   
 
The vast majority of its technological resources are located on a main site, there are 
seventy-five branch offices making use of those centralized resources. For example, 
users of remote offices access applications kept on servers located on the main site. 
Sometimes local users become distance clients accessing servers and facilities remotely 
using VPN connections. Also, third party vendors who are either collaborators or a 
special type of client accessing services from an extranet on the main site either 
through VPN tunnels or using dedicated connections. Web services are offered to allow 
any customer with an Internet connection to make use of different facilities for 
handling online banking activities.   
 
Many of the services are offered within a specified office schedule while some others 
are offered on 24/7 basis such as online payments and accounts consulting.  Annually 
they handle about six million eighty three thousand and five hundred forty seven  
(6,083,547) card transactions5.  This activity moves amounts of twenty millions three 
hundred twelve four hundred and sixty six millions dollars (US$ 20,312,466.76) 
monthly6. 
 
Number one requirement on this institution is to have the entire infrastructure 
available almost all the time. “Almost” because they have not measured their 
availability necessities thus they are not able to specify it in terms of a percentage.  It is 
assumed that for some services the availability needs to be of 99.999 percent and for 
some others a 90.00 percent is enough to cover the required time to keep their 
                                     
5 According to card transactions data from 2009 and first quarter of 2010 
6 This number correspond to a monthly average month from 2009 however there are peaks on the card activity both 
high and low.  
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services. This sentence synthesizes the business objective: to be always available for 
their clients with the minimum costs.  
 
Even though the availability is not the topic of this case study, it was brought to the 
stage because security is part of that precious availability that many enterprises seek to 
have permanently, as the one under study for this work. In order to have this 
permanent availability it is necessary to invest on the right infrastructure to provide 
and secure that infrastructure from viruses and internal/external attacks that can 
disrupt their operations as well. The main topic of this case study is network design 
and security focused on PCI DSS. 
 
They handle more than 6,000,000 card transactions annually thus they fall under the 
category of Level 1 merchants for PCI DSS. They use web servers, application servers 
and have multiple databases to run their operations.   
As it was mentioned before this organization needs multiple incumbents to access the 
data and applications they store and handle: Third-party vendors, customers, business 
associates, internal users, etc.  This situation creates special requirements for security, 
especially because the cardholder environment is not completely isolated from the rest 
of the data.  
 
A couple of years ago a transformation process was started for the whole infrastructure 
of this organization. This change was not motivated because of PCI DSS, indeed it 
started as an effort to reorganize their assets because they inherited an infrastructure 
not so well implemented and several issues were occurring due to that particular 
situation.  
 
The first step to achieve an optimal network implementation is to study the necessities 
on the enterprise environment. This way it is possible to get enough foundation to 
make the right decisions about the procedure to follow. Sometimes the reality is that 
you are not part of the network-designing project since the very beginning making 
impossible that first analyzing step. 
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However, analyzing business particularities and constraints if you are part of a 
network-redesigning project is also good practice. The original infrastructure of this 
organization showed a lack of good analysis for its initial implementation.  
 
Good Network Designing is not a step-by-step generic and well-defined process 
applicable to each and every single enterprise or situation even though there are ways 
to make network designing a successful project by following the correct steps 
(Oppenheimer, 2004), such as:  
 
Analyze requirements 
Develop a logical design  
Develop the physical design  
Test, optimize, and document the design 
 
An optimal network design should provide mechanisms to have the necessary 
performance that does not affect the business operations continuity and allows having 
a satisfactory service level, it should also scale properly when the business grows and 
fit the necessities of the business (Oppenheimer, 2004).    
 
The network in study lacked of the previously mentioned characteristics. Even so, it 
has changed dramatically to improve the security and to be more PCI DSS compliant.  
 
5.1. Regional Situation  
 
Dominican Republic is a country located in the Caribbean.  Its economy is highly 
dependent on both tourism and remittances.  “During the last 12 years remittances 
almost triplicate, going from US$1,088.9 millions to US$3,110.7 millions in 2008, 
with an average annual growing of 15.5% during that period”(Tinta Criolla, 2009).  
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Tourism however still has a leading role on the economy. Each year thousands (near 
four millions in 2009(Iglesias, 2010) tourists decide to spend their vacations on the 
Island.  
 
If people sending remittances and tourists can feel confident about handling their 
transactions in Dominican financial institutions revenues of those activity can keep a 
larger growth rhythm, which at the end will benefit not only the financial sector but 
also the entire country economy. 
 
Given the fact that PCI DSS is a global data security standard, saying that an 
institution is compliant with it, will be captivated by all the customers of that 
institution, either national or internationally. This can be considered as an added value 
of the PCI DSS compliance and a reason to work continuously into keeping that 
compliance. 
 
5.2. Analysis 
 
A process took place in which all retrieved network diagrams were evaluated against 
the real configurations of the network in order to determine the veracity if evolution of 
the network presented in the set of diagrams.  This analysis was made considering 
selected PCI DSS Requirements that are directly related to network designing and 
security.  In the following Section there is a discussion of what was found. 
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6. Network Diagrams Analysis 
 
 
Figure 1  
This diagram dates back from a couple of years ago. It is the first one found in the set 
of documentation collected for this case of study and it will be explained in the 
following lines. Later on, we will see other diagrams showing the changes that the 
network has gone through. This is an attempt to examine and in some cases question 
those changes thinking of PCI DSS requirements. The current status of the network 
will be presented in the last diagram to evaluate the network status towards achieving 
PCI DSS compliance. 
 
Starting from upper left corner the server farm can be seen connected to a core switch 
where all users were also connected.  Different network segments separate users and 
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servers. The access control between them was implemented at the application and 
databases level. There was neither a firewall implementation to protect servers from 
user access or an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) to analyze traffic flowing between 
them. Implementation of Intrusion Prevention Systems is not only a good security 
practice but also part of PCI DSS requirements.  
 
In front of the core switch there was an IPS (IPS 1) to monitor traffic going in and out 
the most internal part of the network containing servers and users inside. This IPS 
seems to be strategically located to inspect every packet going to and coming from 
those internal segments, but the truth is that the proxy server they had to control 
Internet navigation was connected straight to the Internet (See connector 1).  The 
traffic going to Internet from any of the segments behind the IPS went directly to the 
content switch H3 not passing through the IPS before leaving or entering the internal 
segments in that part of the network thus not being monitored.  
 
However, there were two other IPSs (IPS 2 and IPS 3) in each of the ISP connections, 
so traffic entering the network was being analyzed in that point anyhow IPSs analyze 
traffic based on policies, signatures and traffic patterns learned and configured 
through a period of tuning and customization for the intended traffic they will be 
monitoring. Thus the policies you have on one IPS might not be effective monitoring 
certain type of traffic. In this case, the internal traffic was being analyzed by Internet 
IPSs and this could be highly ineffective monitoring.  
 
Web and VPN Servers were behind the firewall it looks like any traffic from the 
Internet had to go through the firewall to access them and databases serving web 
applications were separated on a DMZ (See DMZ DB).  All of these are PCI DSS 
Requirements. H3 and H4 (content switches) were being used as DNS servers and so 
were H1 and H2 providing redundancy for DNS Services. Even though H3 and H4 had 
an interface connected directly to the segment of web servers. If any of them was 
compromised there was an open entry to that segment that was supposedly protected 
by the firewall.  
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Both ISP lines entered to the network going to a hub (See HU1 and HU2). A hub is a 
device that repeats received packets into all its ports thus a host connected to the hub 
can see traffic that does not necessarily have anything to do with the communication it 
is maintaining at a moment. This might allow an intruder “listening” on the channel to 
get enough information about a communication session to be able to perform either a 
spoofing or a “man in the middle” attack.   
 
There are different connections third party vendors (see Square A, B and C). One of 
these connections (See Square C) came from a router directly connected to the same 
switch that web servers were connected.  There was not an IPS in the middle of this 
connection. Traffic coming in and out from that external company was not being 
monitored. Firewalls were controlling third party connections to the internal network 
(including the one depicted in square C). However there was still the issue that the 
switch where that third party was connected had an interface linked to H4 that also 
was connected straight to the internal network. 
 
They had two ISP connections, but this facility was not being used for high availability 
purposes only one of them was functional for navigation and web services publishing. 
This did not work because it was not correctly configured on the equipments and by 
that time their availability requirements were not so strict.  
 
There was an interface of FW2 dedicated for a connection of a third party and there 
was a server there in that segment also. Lamentably accurate information could not be 
retrieved on the purpose of this server. But it was connected in the same switch that 
the router connecting the third party vendor (Square B).  
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Figure 2 
 
In this diagram we can see that the third party vendor previously seen in square C was 
now connected to the switch that the rest of the external companies were connected to 
(Square A). This was a good move because all the connections of third parties were 
separated on a segment of the network just for them (it will be called an extranet from 
now on).  The traffic from that third party was controlled by the firewall (FW2) but 
traffic could not be monitored, because it was connected to a switch located “before” 
the IPS (See box C). Not other considerable changes were made in comparison to the 
first diagram. 
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Figure 3  
 
A new firewall was added to control access from the internal segments to the DMZ. 
PCI DSS requires a firewall between any demilitarized zone and the internal network 
but this is not the reason why this firewall was added. Actually the reason was that 
some of the firewall implementations were made because it was necessary to have 
other interfaces to protect other network segments and the appliances in use did not 
provide them. 
 
Other servers were added in the DMZ with the purpose of publishing the web site. 
Those servers had three interfaces connected to three different VLANs one in the 
segment of the databases; another in the content switch H4 for a connection to the 
public network and the 3rd one was used for synchronization among those servers. 
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Figure 4  
 
A fourth firewall was added to the infrastructure. This one had two interfaces 
connected to the public networks of both ISPs.  Another interface was connected to the 
internal network. The purpose of adding this firewall is not clear (none of the 
contacted personnel had a clear idea on the driving factors for this decision).  There is 
different information about the reason for this movement but many coincide saying 
that it was added because they needed to protect other segments and no interfaces 
were available as with the FW3.  
 
Others say it was added to establish a VPN tunnel with a third party vendor. This 
tunnel was going to be used for monitoring some specific services from an external 
company hired for this. This last affirmation seems more realistic, if we notice that the 
firewall had two interfaces into each of the ISP lines and one interface in the internal 
network.  
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Eventually two of the existent firewalls (FW1 and FW2) were configured in a cluster 
configuration for a high availability (failover).   
 
 
Figure 5  
 
On the two interfaces of the firewall connecting the extranet there was only one IPS.  
This IPS worked for the active line. If a problem occurred in that line, the traffic 
monitoring was not performed. This IPS could have been located right after the switch 
and before the router (See arrow) to monitor all the traffic, even though this would 
leave one of the external companies traffic with no monitoring at all (See Square A). 
The workaround to solve that was the creation of two different VLANs on that same 
switch, one of the IPS interfaces connected to one of those VLANs and all the routers 
for third parties also connected to that VLAN and the other interface of the IPS 
connected to the second VLAN were both lines (active and standby) were also 
Yudit María 
  MS NSSA Final Project 
29   
 
 
connected. That way it was possible to monitor any of the lines. Remember the reason 
of this workaround is that the IPS only had two interfaces. 
 
At this point the network was becoming too complex and it was too hard to 
troubleshoot any issue (a big or an insignificant one) according to the interviewed 
personnel.  
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Figure 6 
 
Figure 7 
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One of the content switches used for DNS is not here anymore. This equipment failed 
and was taken out from the network at that moment.  A mail server was connected to 
the DMZ and to the public network.  Two other VPN Boxes were connected to both 
ISPs to establish a VPN tunnel with another third party.  These VPN Connections 
offered the possibility of having dedicated connection at a much lower cost than a 
“dedicated line” for example (as it was maintained with other third parties, see 
extranet).  
 
Web Services were published only through the connection of the ISP 2.  One of the 
hubs was disconnected and a switch was left on its place. At this point there was not a 
separation between users and servers other than the network segmentation. After this 
moment the network dramatically changed to a new configuration considering PCI 
DSS requirements.  
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Figure 8 
 
Two new firewalls implementation can be seen on this diagram. One of the firewalls 
was placed (A) between the Internet and the internal network (PCI DSS Requirement 
1.3) and another (B) between the DMZ and the internal zone.  This one (B) was also 
protecting server’s access from internal users. One of these servers segments protected 
by the firewall contained all the equipments that were identified as containers of 
cardholder data.   
 
The extranet segment was protected by another cluster of firewalls and an IPS was 
located in front of the connection to monitor all traffic coming in and out of that 
segment.  Another stand-alone firewall stood to keep the VPN tunnel with the 
monitoring service because of compatibility issues (the VPN could not be configured 
on external firewalls because those had an ISP Redundancy configuration and the 
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other end equipments did not support this feature).  Both firewalls (the cluster and the 
stand alone) also protected the internal network of an Internet connection kept with 
an ISP.   Internal users came either from the main office buildings or from remote sites 
connected through a fiber connection or radio transmission. On the line connecting 
those remote users two IPSs were placed.  
 
An appliance for analyzing outgoing mail was between two internal servers, this could 
be a security vulnerability since this box handles traffic going out to the internet and 
any security flaw could be used to compromise it and gain access to the internal 
network.  Web servers were located in a DMZ and databases in another separated 
segment (PCI DSS Requirement 1.3.7). Besides the firewall, a proxy server controlled 
access to those web servers, from the internal networks. Those proxy servers security 
was hardened by closing all ports not required for its correct operation, disabling 
unnecessary services and prohibiting access from not authorized parties, because it 
works as a firewall too. Plus the VLAN on the core switch were they connect was a 
separate one, created only for them.  
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Figure 9  
This is the current network status. It has evolved amazingly and the difference since its 
initial implementations is tangible. At this point, it seems to be a PCI Compliant 
network. It has two firewall implementations protecting the internal network from the 
DMZ and the DMZ protected from the Internet. It has IPSs implementations on each 
Internet connection and on the connection where remote offices traffic arrives. Public 
accessible servers are located in the DMZ and databases accessible by those servers are 
located on a separate network segment.  
 
The appliance for analyzing outgoing mail is now located between the DMZ and an 
internal segment controlled by the firewalls. A stand-alone firewall implementation 
stood to keep a VPN tunnel because of the compatibility issue mentioned before. 
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7. Experience and Impact 
 
After analyzing network diagrams and having personnel interviewed several facts can 
be discussed in here: 
 
7.1. Cardholder Environment: 
 
As in any enterprise this company had different environments: Production, 
Development and Testing. However, those environments were neither separated nor 
controlled. Any server on development and/or testing segment could easily access any 
other server from production and vice versa. There were controls at the database level 
but not at the network level.   An insecure testing or development segment can be the 
wide open door through which intruders access your systems.  
 
In the configuration of the network seen on Figure 1, there is not a clear separation of 
the cardholder environment from the rest of the applications. For example servers use 
to handle card transactions were mixed with the rest of the servers, probably on a 
common LAN segment, meaning the access to almost anywhere in the network also 
implied access to the cardholder environment.  
 
Servers in production stored, handled and transmitted credit card data, and since 
there was not a clear limit on which of those servers in fact handled cardholder data 
there was a big issue about the protection of those servers.  However, it was also an 
issue trying to secure all servers to comply with PCI DSS because there was not a 
firewall that could do it at that moment. Eventually all servers were secured with a new 
firewall implementation and those handling credit card data were separated on a 
network segment only for them. 
 
Any of the collected diagrams described the flow of a card transaction, thus it was 
difficult to properly determine which servers were participating on the different types 
of card transactions or were storing cardholder information. Some activities were 
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performed to try to find out which servers handled critical information related to 
cards.  For example: They did an application list, containing all those applications used 
for the business operations, either from outsiders or in-house developed7. According to 
the connections made by those applications either to databases or other servers they 
could determine which servers might contain card data.  This application classification 
was a helpful process to separate the cardholder environment from the rest of the 
systems8.  
 
Other activities performed for the process of identification and segmentation of the 
cardholder environment: 
 
Interviews with databases administrator and the people handling applications that had 
to do with credit cards to discover each possible server used for card transactions.  
Observing which of those identified servers had interactions among them (network) or 
interacted with other unidentified servers.  
 
A script was run on all machines to verify which of them was storing card data.  This 
process lasted several weeks because it was a very exhaustive process about 1500 
machines. 
 
However it must been said, that cardholder environment is not completely isolated, 
and shares many resources with other data.  It means that the PCI DSS requirements 
affect the entire infrastructure. Because it is considered that all of it is part of the 
cardholder environment. 
 
7.2. Firewall Implementation 
 
The first thing we can see in the network diagrams is that everything is mixed together. 
Users and servers coexisted right next to each other under the same environment.  
                                     
7  The list of applications is included on Appendix B.   
8 Not a complete separation but at least identification of the vast majority of servers containing Cardholder Data or 
participate in card transactions 
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They were segmented in different subnets but there were not other control or 
restriction mechanisms to separate them. This created a huge security flaw that could 
allow the success of an attack with no need of a big effort. Since the very beginning a 
firewall should have been implemented to protect server from internal access. Also 
those servers should have been separated among them to prevent any unnecessary and 
unauthorized access from one server to another.  
 
The firewall configuration was poorly implemented. It had a DMZ protecting the 
database segment from public access but the web servers were not protected because 
they were reachable without having to go through the firewall.  PCI DSS first 
requirement establishes: 
 
Requirement 1: Install and maintain a firewall configuration to 
protect cardholder data. 
  
1.2 Build a firewall configuration that restricts connections between 
untrusted networks and any system components in the cardholder data 
environment.  
 
Their proxy server navigated to the outside (internet) going directly from the internal 
network without having to go pass through the firewalls. This is not compliant with 
PCI DSS requirement 1.1.3 that establishes the use of a firewall at each Internet 
Connection (See Appendix A for more Details on PCI DSS requirements).  
 
7.3. Network and Infrastructure 
 
One of the content switches had a direct connection to the internal network (check H3 
on the Diagram 1). These layer 4-7 communication equipments were used as DNS 
servers. They were publicly accessible and one of them had a direct connection to the 
internal network containing servers and users.  
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The core switch implementation was not homogeneous with the rest of the 
communication equipments implementation. The management of this core 
implementation became more and more unfeasible because the local personnel were 
not properly trained and the administration of those equipments was allegedly 
difficult. This situation created a dependency of the vendors of those equipments that 
was creating problems whenever any particular situation appeared and a 
troubleshooting was required.  
 
The servers network interface cards only supported 10/100 Mbps speed. It worked 
correctly during many years. However, at some point the business was growing 
considerably and needs changed. The appearance of new applications, services and 
users, increased traffic being handled and the demand of resources to function 
properly also went up.  So they thought it was a right move to:  1. Increase the links’ 
capabilities to 1000Mbps Links and 2. Migrate all NICs on each server to process a 
higher amount of packets and handle more traffic to take advantage of this higher 
capacity.    
 
But, were they really conscious on how much they should have increased NICs 
capabilities or links speed? According to information provided by the personnel 
working that part, no. Even with applications demanding more and users being added 
to the company, the network performance did not reach unbearable levels for the 
business operations. Add to this was the fact that the business did not have a clearly 
defined network performance goal. There were no metrics on how the performance 
was on that time or how the network utilization was behaving to support the decision 
of increasing everything (including costs).  
 
Links capacity was increased, because the network was becoming “slow”. They 
changed their links capabilities pretty much in an intuitive/perceptive move not 
supported by the corresponding analysis and metrics captures.  At the end it came out 
to be a good move. Because they did continue growing but also they still face issues 
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with the performance of the network especially for some specific LAN segments were 
hundreds of servers are contained. 
 
When changes to the servers and links were implemented, it came up that other 
equipments in the infrastructure appeared not to be capable of handling 1000Mbps 
links, and they started saturating the network causing disruptions on the 
communication of the different parts of the network. Those were the IPSs 
implementation (Intrusion Prevention Systems).   Those IPSs were strategically moved 
to other segments of the network where they still provided protection without affecting 
performance (See figure 8). 
 
Unfortunately all this decisions and upgrades because of performance issues were not 
properly documented and analyzed. There is no information saved from those days 
that can support the alleged theories of the reason why those changes of speed were 
made. 
 
7.4. Access Control 
 
The information that is to be accessed by users of the complete company is centralized 
and located within network segments that also handle critical information such as 
cardholder data. Which makes access control more critical. 
 
Databases were distributed among multiple servers.  Databases serving distinct 
applications were stored in different locations. Even if those databases had common 
elements.  This caused unnecessary information duplicity.  Furthermore, those servers 
lacked of redundancy in the case of a failure. There were several databases storing 
cardholder data spread along the network.  
 
The encryption equipments (encryption key holders) were accessible from anywhere in 
the network.  Later on with the latest firewall implementation and due to their 
criticality, they were segmented on an interface of the firewalls dedicated only to them, 
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which was a great step for PCI DSS that has requirements for Key Management, even 
though this part is not being considered on this case study (PCI DSS Requirement 3.5). 
 
 
In the following lines there will be a discussion of the analysis made of the 
implementations, considering the standard requirements. The application 
requirements will be also discussed, because even though they are not part of the 
networking and infrastructure they are a very important topic on the standard.  
 
Requirement 6: Developing and Maintaining Secure Applications and 
Systems 
 
PCI DSS has requirements for securing payment card applications and systems.  A 
walk through each of the requirements evaluating them against the current situation 
will clarify the position of the institution towards the standard compliance.   
 
Requirement 6.1 is about updates and latest patch. In this company there is a policy 
that establishes the implementation of updates and patches but it is limited only to a 
certain platform. Thus the updates and patches policy is not applicable to another 
software and applications.  Although the firewall policy, for example, establishes that 
they must updated to the latest software version and have the latest updates and/or 
corrections released by the vendors. However, there is not a general updates and 
patches application policy establishing, among other things, a timeframe required for 
this updating activity.  According to PCI DSS most recent patches and updates must be 
applied not later than 30 days after its release. Also, there is not a process to identify 
newly discovered security vulnerabilities affecting applications different from web 
applications specific vulnerabilities. 
 
Requirement 6.3: Developing software application in accordance to PCI DSS and 
based on industry best practices.  For software development, there is an established 
process that includes points like validation of data inputs, error handling (for example 
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errors referring to login methods (Requirement 6.3.1.2) do not provide an explicit 
explanation of the failure cause, generic error messages for any application errors, 
etc.). However, in this process there is not a validation for the use of secure 
communications methods requirement (Requirement 6.3.1.4), for example. There is 
not an auditing of the coding for applications developed in-house or used from 
externals; activities contemplated on the development established process are not 
evaluated for applications bought from outside.  
 
The test, production and development environments are separated and partially 
controlled (Requirement 6.3.2). There is not a duty separation between tests, 
development and production environments (Requirement 6.3.3), developers do have 
access to production environment.  Connections are kept from development to 
production, and from test to production and test to development.  Having those 
connections is necessary because otherwise the development and test activities could 
be completely stopped since there are functionalities existent only on production and 
any new development for those cases implies using the production environment. This 
also happens for several applications that do not have a dedicated test environment.   
Correcting this implies the creation of the three separated environments for each and 
every single application and/or system, which can provide an enhancement on 
security, but it might also cost a considerable amount of money. 
 
Primary Account Numbers in production are still used for test and development for 
some applications (Requirement 6.3.4).  This is a consequence of the lack of separation 
on the different environments (Production, Test and Development). 
 
Requirements 6.3.5 and 6.3.6 for removing data before a system is released to 
production is not established as a requirement. It is done in some cases but not 
because is an obligation.  
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There is not a coding revision since there are not personnel responsible for this. 
Developers freely create applications following the best practices, but nobody certifies 
this.  
 
There are changes control procedures (Requirement 6.4) documented both through 
automated applications and manually created, however there is not an exhaustive 
documentation of changes impact (Requirement 6.4.1) because is not required thus is 
obviated in documentation of changes control.  There is a provision to have 
appropriate management sign-off  (Requirement 6.4.2), testing (Requirement 6.4.3) 
and back-out procedures (Requirement 6.4.4) with the use of written documents to 
implement changes.   
 
All web applications are tested (Requirement 6.5 and 6.6) by the testing personnel and 
controlled by integrity personnel. There are dedicated teams for those tasks. Each 
application is also tested with different automated tools to validate the security against 
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), SQL Injection, Xpath Injection, Malicious File Execution, 
etc.  However the process is informal, does not have a written procedure or policy 
requesting so.  There is not a specific requirement of using a web-application firewall 
(Requirement 6.6) for publicly accessible web applications but host IPS installed on 
web servers fulfill this requirement.  
 
Requirement 7: Restrict access to cardholder data by business need-
to-know  
 
Access restriction to cardholder data cannot be checked as performed completely 
successfully because cardholder data resides not only on specific servers and 
databases; it is also contained in file texts, physical paper/documents, e-mails and so 
on.  
 
The control implemented in computing systems is the creation of profiles with explicit 
access limitations based on the type of work performed by an individual (Requirement 
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7.1.29 and 7.2.2). There is no written requirement on a form to configure an access, or 
to elevate the privileges of a user, but the compensation measures is the requirement 
of an email from the superior authorizing the access (Requirement 7.1.3).  
 
Requirement 10: Track and monitor all access to network resources 
and cardholder data  
 
Since each username in the network is created for a specific user it is possible to link 
all access to an individual user (Requirement 10.2). The mechanism to control that 
each user is unique is through the use of both personal IDs and employee number 
assigned at the moment of hiring someone.  
 
There are applications for log consolidation. There are logs activated on every database 
to keep track of any changes performed on the systems (Requirement 10.2): individual 
accesses, invalid access attempts, initialization of the audit logs, among other 
activities.  They use 3 applications to satisfy this particular point of the standard. 
Those tools were approved to be PCI Compliant, however, the personnel handling 
those tools must be highly trained in the use, because they not only do track and 
monitoring as require by PCI in part 10, but also can impact the performance of the 
systems being monitored.  
 
The time synchronization still lacks of a dedicated server for these purposes.  This is 
critical because in the occurrence of an event it will not be possible to correlate logging 
and audit trails to perform an investigation.   
 
There is a log server dedicated only for this purposes it is controlled through the 
firewall. But backups of this server do not have any special security requirement 
(Requirement 10.5.3). Those automated tools control logs Integrity. Alerts are 
generated whenever data is altered.  
                                     
9 Numbers with this nomenclature refer to standard requirements subsections and can be checked on Appendix A.  
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There is not a policy establishing the timeframe for storing logs (Requirement 10.7), 
and the required availability of those logs.  
 
Requirement 11: Regularly test security systems and processes 
 
Wireless Access Points are non-existent within this enterprise, but there is not a 
formal requirement and/or procedure for periodically testing the presence of wireless 
access points (Requirement 11.1). It is known that an illegitimate access point can be 
introduced either by an internal employee or by a customer taking advantage of lack of 
security at a certain point.  
 
There is not a formal procedure establishing the frequency of network vulnerability 
scans. It is not required to do vulnerability assessment after major changes on the 
network. However the personnel responsible of the network security perform this task 
at least twice a month being this is a particular initiative. It should be established as a 
formal procedure for security reasons and to comply with Requirement 11.2 of the 
standard. 
 
Penetration Tests both internal and external are established as a policy (Requirement 
11.3). However there is not a procedure to implement corrections to vulnerabilities 
found on those penetration tests. This should be done according to PCI DSS 
requirements.  
 
IPSs (Intrusion Prevention Systems) are implemented to monitor traffic coming in 
going out of the network. These systems are configured to emit alerts low, medium or 
high. Those alerts are sent to a 24x7x365 monitoring team. IPSs are configured with a 
policy containing a number of signatures to detect different type of possible attacks.  
The policy is continuously tuned to include the largest amount of firms to detect 
several different attacks. This IPSs use different methods to detect and prevent 
intrusion such as port assignment, heuristics, port following, protocol tunneling, 
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protocol analysis, RFC compliance, TCP Reassembly, Flow Reassembly, and Statistical 
Analysis and pattern Matching (Rouland, 2004).  Those devices are constantly 
updated but there is not a formal requirement for this. There are network IPS and host 
based IPS to monitor the traffic over servers considered critical, sensitive and 
containers of cardholder data (Requirement 11.5).  
 
File integrity monitoring is inspected by two software applications but it was not 
possible to get details on this point.   
 
7.5. Costs 
 
The whole implementation of micro and macro projects for PCI DSS compliance 
purposes ascended to almost a million dollars for this company. Remember this is a 
level one company transacting with more than six millions credit cards annually and 
total benefits over 16 million dollars10. This might sound as a high cost for a “security 
project” but it is worth the value if the repercussions of having fines and eventually 
losing the right to negotiate with card brands are considered.  Card transactions are 
part of the most profitable activities for a company like this one of the type being used 
in this case study.  
 
                                     
10 This are general gains, no statistics about gains only because of card transactions could be gathered 
Solution  Requirement  Cost 
Antivirus    US$90,000.00  
Logging and events correlation tools    US $100,000.00  
Two Factor Authentication Solution 
(Tokens) 8.2 - 8.3   US $30,000.00  
Database Security Auditing Software (Active 
Blocking)  10.2 Y 10.3   US $200,000.00  
Web Applications Security Assessment tools  6.3   US $32,000.00  
External Assessors: Gap Analysis, Internal 
and External Penetration Tests.    US $100,000.00  
Data Loss Prevention Solution    US$70,000.00  
External assessors for correcting internal    US $50,000.00  
Yudit María 
  MS NSSA Final Project 
46   
 
 
 
Is important considering that this is an initial investment, this might make it seems as 
extremely high, but after this, there should be less costs for keeping the compliance 
status.  
 
 
 
External assessors for correcting internal 
(in-house developed) applications  
   US $50,000.00  
Internal and External Firewalls    US $200,000.00  
Network and Host Based IPSs     US $90,000.00  
Firewall solution for virtual servers     US$25,000.00  
TOTAL  $987,000.00  
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8. Findings and Results 
 
In general security has three important stages: 
Policy creation: to regulate the correct use of resources  
Infrastructure implementation: to ensure the policies are being followed 
Alertness: to evaluate how effective the implementation. Also, to consider 
whether new changes are necessary to improve security.  
 
It can be affirmed that PCI DSS also considers those stages. The standard is not only 
about implementing solutions for security, data loss prevention antivirus or 
encryption, just to name a few. It is also about documenting those implementations as 
well as creating policies and making users aware or them.  
 
This particular company has made a big effort about policy creation. They currently 
have policies for password management, firewall installation, information 
classification, antivirus software, access control, and secure application designing and 
information security in general.    
 
 For example the configuration norm for firewalls being used include requirements for: 
 
• Changing the default usernames and passwords, with a password that complies 
with the robustness required by the password policy. 
• Configuring the equipments to synchronize with a central NTP Server (Network 
Time Protocol). This is important in case of an event occurrence logs and data 
to be analyzed and correlated properly in the considered timeframe for 
auditing.   
• Stateful Inspection of packets and connections and anti-spoofing mechanisms 
to be enabled. This provides the possibility of reducing the risk of attacks 
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through illegitimate connections and false traffic sources impersonating legal 
ones.  
• Key exchange encryption, data integrity and data encryption for VPN (Virtual 
Private Network Settings) to be made implementing protocols and algorithms 
such as IPSec, IKE, AES128 and AES256.  
• Configurations requirements for blocking all traffic  (deny all) by default. 
• Disabling of routing services on the firewalls 
• Proper configurations for SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) 
including proper community settings and specified host from whom SNMP 
requests can be accepted.  
• Requirements of justifications to enable rules allowing services and protocols 
not commonly known.  
• Restrictions of ICMP traffic.  
• Configurations of banners displaying messages alerting the access to secure and 
restricted equipment which use is auditable and intended to be accessed only by 
authorized personnel. 
• Restriction of accesses to the equipment from anywhere in the network by 
default. Only authorized personnel can have the access and only through a 
secure protocol such as SSL. 
• Only SFTP should be allowed. In case of inevitable requirement of FTP 
configuration allowance this connections must be restricted to specific servers 
from specific machines.  
• Configuration of NAT rule to protect disclosure of internal network IP 
addresses. 
• All servers accessible from the outside should be placed on a DMZ. 
• Any access to the exterior will be restricted by default. 
• Logging requirement for any connection except those of SNMP protocol 
generating trivial and excessive amount of traffic. 
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• Restrictions of certain services and ports11 unless they are strictly required by 
business activities.  
• Analysis of SMTP traffic. 
• Enabling of TCPSYN defenses.  
 
However they do not have a configuration norm for routers and communication 
equipments.  This point is being currently worked out.  
 
There is a firewall implementation on each Internet connection and between the DMZ 
and the internal network. This firewall implementation is on a high availability 
configuration to ensure business continuity.  But in the firewall configuration norm 
there is not an explicit requirement for this type of configuration, which is required by 
the standard. 
 
They also have a formal process for approving and testing connections through the 
firewall (Requirement 1.1.112). This formal process includes the completion of a form 
with the source and destination IP addresses, the protocol and service, justification 
and systems being affected by the required access. The correspondent administrative 
personnel in the security department evaluate this form and approve or disapprove it.  
 
A current network diagram is kept for the general infrastructure. This diagram is 
updated every time a change in the network is performed. However they do not have a 
detailed connection diagram representing connections to the cardholder environment 
(Requirement 1.1.2).  They do not have a diagram describing the flow of card 
connections whenever a transaction is performed. This flow is not completely 
identified for some activities (for some other it is). 
 
 
                                     
11 Explicit Description of the services and ports has been omitted for privacy  
12 See Appendix A for details on the requirements 
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In the configuration policy there is a description of groups and roles for the 
management of the firewalls. In there it is clearly explained who is responsible for 
what, creating an adequate limitation/restriction of authorized people that can make 
changes on the firewalls (this is not applicable to all network components as required 
in 1.1.4). 
 
Within the firewall configuration norm there is a description of specific ports and 
services allowed for the business operations but this list is not exhaustive. It needs to 
be completed and more detailed. There are common ports and services such as (HTTP, 
HTTPS or SSH) and some others not that common that are part of business specific 
applications (this part is still incomplete). There is a requirement of documenting 
which of those protocols and services is insecure and that is also incomplete. It 
requires an analysis for identified protocols and services that has not been made yet. 
(Requirement 1.1.5). 
 
Requirement 1.1.6 establishes a review of firewall and routers rules at least every six 
months.  This is not established on any of the policies or configuration norms and 
there is not a defined formal process to complete this activity.  
 
Connection to critical servers containing cardholder data is restricted. Inbound and 
outbound traffic to those servers network segment is strictly controlled with the 
requirement of proper justification. However cardholder data environment is not 
restricted only to those servers. Any intermediate host that this data goes through is 
part of the cardholder data environment and some of those hosts probably cannot be 
restricted as much as those servers. So there is an issue in here about the “restriction 
to what is necessary for the cardholder environment” point established on 
Requirement 1.2.1. 
 
The personnel in charge of handling it back up router configuration files periodically. 
Configuration files are also collected daily with the use of the monitoring tool. But 
there is not a secure repository specifically destined to store all this backups in a 
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secure manner. They are not properly synchronized either, it means that the 
configuration running on equipment is not verified against the backed up 
configuration after a reboot for example.  (Requirement 1.2.2) 
 
Requirement 1.2.3. Wireless traffic to the cardholder environment is controlled and 
restricted to the specified servers identified to be handling cardholder data, and also to 
databases containing cardholder data as well. But it is not possible saying that wireless 
access is completely controlled to the cardholder environment, because of what was 
previously explained of this environment scope. It is important to note that this 
company only has wireless links to support transmissions of high amounts of data 
among its different branches.  They do not have wireless Acces Points. 
 
Direct access to the Internet is prohibited (Requirement 1.3) There is a DMZ created 
for any of those services accessible by the public and controlled by the firewall 
(Requirement 1.3.1), any access from the internet only goes to servers contained within 
that DMZ. Accesses from internal IP addresses coming from the Internet (1.3.4) are 
prohibited through specific rules configuration in the external firewalls (this is 
established on the configuration norm of the firewalls).  
 
No direct routes (1.3.3) are configured between the Internet and the servers and 
databases containing cardholder data. Actually there is a firewall protecting those 
servers and databases. Any connection to those segments is highly restricted by that 
firewall implementation.  
 
Cardholder data container servers and databases do not pass traffic directly to the 
Internet. Any data going out to the Internet first goes to a protected segment. These 
servers can only access IP addresses within that segment (Requirement 1.3.5). 
However some of those servers still access Internet addresses because of business 
necessities. The compensation control for this is that the access is restricted to a 
specific IP address through a specific port.  
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Stateful inspection is implemented for all connections through the network 
(Requirement 1.3.6).  Databases to be accessed for services published for outsiders are 
on a segment separated from the DMZ and separated from the internal network as 
well. (Requirement 1.3.7). NAT (Network Addressing Translation) is used for Internal 
IP addresses going to the Internet or to any third party. 
 
Installation of personal firewall on any laptop is established as a policy but some 
personnel using laptops can disable the firewall and this is not controlled by a policy.  
Disk Encryption is being implemented as part of an end point security solution also 
required for laptops. 
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9. Recommendations 
 
They should create a configuration norm for routers and communication equipments 
configuration norm. Methods of enforcing the application of the norm should be 
created. 
 
There should be a correction on the updates and patches policy:  
 
• To make it extensive to the whole system components 
• To establish the minimum timeframe in which the updates must be applied.   
• To include a structured procedure to audit the updates activities.  
 
Personnel in charge of reviewing code on used applications should be hired (There is 
neither a person nor a department responsible of this activity).  
 
Production, Test and Development environments should be isolated. This might have 
a high cost depending on the system or application being separated. But an insecure 
test and/or development environments can give access to an intruder to production 
systems causing a data breach. There should be an evaluation on how much you can 
invest on securing and separating those environments and find ways to handle that 
security the most cost efficient possible and without interrupting business operations.  
 
They should create a policy for separating duties between production, test and 
development personnel, and educate the personnel to not incurring in activities that 
they are not authorized to do even if they have enough power to do it (because in some 
cases there is not possible to restrict users for operations’ sake).  
 
Primary Account Number in production could be scrambled or use an algorithm 
method to convert PAN data into fictitious values to be used in test and development. 
Yudit María 
  MS NSSA Final Project 
54   
 
 
There should be a consideration of changing these values on any test/development 
system/application where they appeared.  
 
There should be a paragraph on the policy for production date requiring the 
elimination of test data. Another paragraph should be added for changes control 
requiring a measure of impact the changes can have over the entire infrastructure.  
 
Procedures to perform web-applications assessment should be formally instituted. 
Requiring the use of both automated tools and manual verification. 
 
Centralized Log Server should be backed up in another server controlled by the 
firewall and in tapes stored in a physically controlled location and backups should be 
created daily, weekly and monthly.  
 
Creation of a log and log backup policy, specifying the period of time that logs must be 
available for immediate use (3 months minimum according to the standard), and the 
total period for keeping system logs (at least one year to comply with the standards).  
 
Implementation of wireless analyzers to detect illegitimate access points should be 
considered and a formal process to perform this activity. Also keep a log providing 
constancy of when it is done.  
 
Whenever a Penetration Test is performed there must be a requirement to implement 
corrections in a minimum timeframe. In case the correction involves long-term 
activities this should be planned, projected and start to be executed in the minor time 
possible. Especially for  high or medium vulnerabilities.  
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10. Conclusions 
 
PCI DSS Compliance is not a project, is a transformation process. Your first link on 
that process is the user (as in almost every system). They have to be actively 
participants on the security schema. They have to know policies. And you should 
encourage and motivate them to work under those policies as well as make the security 
team aware of any particular situation that they considered is violating PCI DSS 
mandates.  
 
You can have all policies and procedures well designed, established and easily 
accessible but if there are not enforcement mechanisms it is possible that the vast 
majority will not follow those guides. It is not that you will turn your organization into 
a military base, but you must find a way to make users follow policies. Or even better 
keep them motivated to do it.  
 
You should never use a technology if do not have the expertise on your personnel to 
manage and troubleshoot this technology. If despite of not having the required 
knowledge on the personnel you are still willing to use the technology, considering an 
outsourcing option. Make sure this outsourcing is a 100% available depending on how 
critical the implementation is, and the impact it can have on your business if it fails.  
 
If you get the compliance you should work actively on maintain it. It is not enough to 
have deployed a well-designed network and security infrastructure that probably cost 
you a lot of money. You should constantly keep track on what is happening on that 
infrastructure and how are changes being handled and documented. This might be 
overwhelming if you infrastructure is big enough, but you should find the most 
adequate methods to do this. Either by using automated tools of by having personnel 
dedicated only to this purposes. This might be costly but it would be more costly losing 
Yudit María 
  MS NSSA Final Project 
56   
 
 
the compliance status or even worst having your business involved in a case of data 
breach.  
 
Achieving PCI DSS can be very expensive depending on which point the company is. 
But it can be more expensive to face a security breach case for not being compliant. 
However this compliant status does not ensure that you have a secure infrastructure 
but at least means that you are following well-known security best practices for specific 
sensitive data as cardholder data is.   
 
Being compliant gives you a wildcard in case you have a data breach case. Also the 
brands have economical incentives for that who are compliant, and even more 
attractive is the fact that the company can be listed as PCI compliant, which will be 
known by all the people that do business with the company. This is a good boost for in 
terms of reputation. 
 
By October 2010 the PCI Security Standards Council will release a new version of the 
standard. New technological advances offer the possibility of enhancing security in any 
sector, but also posse a higher risk of having data compromised, this will be considered 
for the modifications that will be introduced to the standard. For example, chip and 
pin technologies, end-to-end encryption and tokenization(Westervelt, 2010) are part 
of the technologies that might be considered for the new version of the standard. 
 
Cloud (Westervelt, 2010) computing and virtualization are relatively new fields that 
still have several security issues to be solved but are being widely implemented.   
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11. Glossary 
 
PCI DSS: Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard. 
 
Phishing: a social engineering method where the attacker makes a victim believe that 
is the legitimate person/business and ask for confidential information either 
electronically or by phone). 
 
PAN: Principal Account Number  
PIN: Personal Identification Number entered by cardholder during a card-present 
transaction, and/or encrypted PIN block present within the transaction message 
NAT: Network Addressing Translation 
NTP: Network Time Protocol 
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Appendix A 
 
PCI DSS Requirement: Regular Letters 
Testing Procedures to ensure compliance with the requirement: Italic Letters 
 
1.1. A formal process for approving and testing all network connections and changes to the firewall 
and router configurations.  
 
1.1.1. Verify that there is a formal process for testing and approval of all network connections 
and changes to firewall and router configurations.  
 
1.1.2 Current network diagram with all connections to cardholder data, including any wireless 
networks.  
 
1.1.2.a Verify that a current network diagram (for example, one that shows cardholder data 
flows over the network) exists and that it documents all connections to cardholder data, 
including any wireless networks.  
 
    1.1.2.b Verify that the diagram is kept current.  
                   
1.1.3 Requirements for a firewall at each Internet connection and between any demilitarized zone 
(DMZ) and the internal network zone  
 
1.1.3 Verify that firewall configuration standards include requirements for a firewall at each 
Internet connection and between any DMZ and the internal network zone. Verify that the 
current network diagram is consistent with the firewall configuration standards.   
                                     
1.1.5 Documentation and business justification for use of all services, protocols, and ports 
allowed, including documentation of security features implemented for those protocols 
considered to be insecure. 
 
1.1.5.a Verify that firewall and router configuration standards include a documented list of 
services, protocols and ports necessary for business—for example, hypertext transfer protocol 
(HTTP) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Secure Shell (SSH), and Virtual Private Network 
(VPN) protocols.  
 
1.1.5.b Identify insecure services, protocols, and ports allowed; and verify they are necessary 
and that security features are documented and implemented by examining firewall and router 
configuration standards and settings for each service. An example of an insecure service, 
protocol, or port is FTP, which passes user credentials in clear-text.    
       
1.2 Build a firewall configuration that restricts connections between untrusted networks and any system 
components in the cardholder data environment.  
 
Note: An “untrusted network” is any network that is external to the networks belonging to the entity 
under review, and/or which is out of the entity's ability to control or manage.  
 
1.2 Examine firewall and router configurations to verify that connections are restricted between 
untrusted networks and system components in the cardholder data environment, as follows:  
   
1.2.1 Restrict inbound and outbound traffic to that which is necessary for the cardholder data    
environment.  
 
1.2.1.a Verify that inbound and outbound traffic is limited to that which is necessary for 
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the cardholder data environment, and that the restrictions are documented.  
 
1.2.1.b Verify that all other inbound and outbound traffic is specifically denied, for 
example by using explicit “deny all” or an implicit deny after allow statement. 
 
    1.2.2 Secure and synchronize router configuration files.   
 
 
1.2.2 Verify that router configuration files are secure and synchronized—for example, 
running configuration files (used for normal running of the routers) and start-up 
configuration files (used when machines are re-booted), have the same, secure 
configurations.                    
 
          
   1.2.3 Install perimeter firewalls between any wireless networks and the cardholder data 
environment, and configure these firewalls to deny or control (if such traffic is necessary for 
business purposes) any traffic from the wireless environment into the cardholder data 
environment.   
 
1.2.3 Verify that there are perimeter firewalls installed between any wireless networks 
and systems that store cardholder data, and that these firewalls deny or control (if such 
traffic is necessary for business purposes) any traffic from the wireless environment into 
the cardholder data environment.  
                   
 
1.3 Prohibit direct public access between the Internet and any system component in  
the cardholder data environment.  
 
1.3 Examine firewall and router configurations, as detailed below, to determine that there is no 
direct access between the Internet and system components, including the choke router at the 
Internet, the DMZ router and firewall, the DMZ cardholder segment, the perimeter router, and 
the internal cardholder network segment. 
   
1.3.1 Implement a DMZ to limit inbound and outbound traffic to only protocols that are 
necessary for the   cardholder data environment.  
 
1.3.1 Verify that a DMZ is implemented to limit inbound and outbound traffic to 
only protocols   that are        necessary for the cardholder data environment.  
 
                     1.3.2 Limit inbound Internet traffic to IP addresses within the DMZ.  
 
   1.3.2 Verify that inbound Internet traffic is limited to IP addresses within the DMZ.                    
 
1.3.3 Do not allow any direct routes inbound or outbound for traffic between the Internet 
and the cardholder data environment.  
 
1.3.3 Verify there is no direct route inbound or outbound for traffic between the 
Internet and the cardholder data environment.  
 
                   1.3.4 Do not allow internal addresses to pass from the Internet into the DMZ.  
 
   1.3.4 Verify that internal addresses cannot pass from the Internet into the DMZ.  
                   
1.3.5 Restrict outbound traffic from the cardholder data environment to the Internet such 
that outbound traffic can only access IP addresses within the DMZ.  
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1.3.5 Verify that outbound traffic from the cardholder data environment to the 
Internet can only access IP addresses within the DMZ.  
                  
             
1.3.6 Implement stateful inspection, also known as dynamic packet filtering. (That is, only 
”established” connections are allowed into the network.)  
 
1.3.6 Verify that the firewall performs stateful inspection (dynamic packet filtering).  
[Only established connections should be allowed in, and only if they are associated 
with a previously established session (run a port scanner on all TCP ports with “syn 
reset” or ”syn ack” bits set—a response means packets are allowed through even if 
they are not part of a previously established session).]  
                   
1.3.7 Place the database in an internal network zone, segregated from the DMZ.  
 1.3.7 Verify that the database is on an internal network zone, segregated from the 
DMZ.  
                   
1.3.8 Implement IP masquerading to prevent internal addresses from being translated and 
revealed on the Internet, using RFC 1918 address space. Use network address translation 
(NAT) technologies—for example, port address translation (PAT).  
 
1.3.8 For the sample of firewall and router components, verify that NAT or other 
technology using RFC 1918 address space is used to restrict broadcast of IP addresses 
from the internal network to the Internet (IP masquerading).   
                   
                   
1.4 Install personal firewall software on any mobile and/or employee-owned computers 
with direct connectivity to the Internet (for example, laptops used by employees), which are 
used to access the Organization’s network.  
 
1.4.a Verify that mobile and/or employee-owned computers with direct connectivity 
to the Internet (for example, laptops used by employees), and which are used to access 
the organization’s network, have personal firewall software installed and active.  
 
1.4.b Verify that the personal firewall software is configured by the organization to 
specific standards and is not alterable by mobile computer users.  
                   
 
6.1 Ensure that all system components and software have the latest vendor-supplied security patches 
installed. Install critical security patches within one month of release. Note: An organization may 
consider applying a risk-based approach to prioritize their patch installations. For example, by 
prioritizing critical infrastructure (for example, public-facing  devices and systems, databases) higher 
than less-critical internal devices, to ensure high-priority systems and devices are addressed within one 
month, and addressing less critical devices and systems within three months. 
 
6.1.a For a sample of system components and related software, compare the list of security 
patches installed on each system to the most recent vendor security patch list, to verify that 
current vendor patches are installed. 
 
6.1.b Examine policies related to security patch installation to verify they require installation 
of all critical new security patches within one month. 
 
6.2 Establish a process to identify newly discovered security vulnerabilities (for example, subscribe to 
alert services freely available on the Internet). Update configuration standards as required by  PCI DSS 
Requirement 2.2 to address new vulnerability issues. 
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6.2.a Interview responsible personnel to verify that  processes are implemented to identify 
new security vulnerabilities. 
 
6.2.b Verify that processes to identify new security vulnerabilities include using outside 
sources for security vulnerability information and updating the system configuration 
standards reviewed in Requirement 2.2 as new vulnerability issues are found. 
 
6.3 Develop software applications in accordance with PCI DSS (for example, secure authentication and 
logging) and based on industry best practices, and incorporate information security throughout the 
software development life cycle.  
 
6.3.a Obtain and examine written software development processes to verify that the 
processes are based on industry standards, security is included throughout the life cycle, and 
software applications are developed in accordance with PCI DSS. 
 
6.3.b From an examination of written software development processes, interviews of 
software developers, and examination of relevant data (network configuration 
documentation, production and test data, etc. 
 
6.3.1 Testing of all security patches, and system and software configuration changes before 
deployment. 
 
6.3.1 All changes (including patches) are tested before being deployed into production. 
 
6.3.1.1 Validation of all input (to prevent cross-site scripting, injection flaws, 
malicious file execution, etc.) 
 
6.3.1.2 Validation of proper error handling 
 
6.3.1.3 Validation of secure cryptographic storage 
 
6.3.1.4 Validation of secure communications 
 
6.3.1.5 Validation of proper role-based access control (RBAC) 
 
6.3.2 Separate development/test and production environments 
 
6.3.2 The development/test environments are separate from the production 
environment, with access control in place to enforce the separation. 
 
6.3.3 Separation of duties between development/test and production environments 
 
6.3.3 There is a separation of duties between personnel assigned to the 
development/test environments and those assigned to the production environment. 
 
6.3.4 Production data (live PANs) are not used for testing or development 
 
6.3.4 Production data (live PANs) are not used for testing and development, or are 
sanitized before use. 
 
6.3.5 Removal of test data and accounts before production systems become active 
6.3.5 Test data and accounts are removed before a production system becomes active. 
 
6.3.6 Removal of custom application accounts, user IDs, and passwords before applications 
become active or are released to customers 
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6.3.6 Custom application accounts, user IDs and/or passwords are removed before 
system goes into production or is released to customers. 
 
6.3.7 Review of custom code prior to release to production or customers in order to identify any 
potential coding vulnerability Note: This requirement for code reviews applies to all custom 
code (both internal and public-facing), as part of the system development life cycle required by 
PCI DSS Requirement 6.3. Code reviews can be conducted by knowledgeable internal personnel 
or third parties. Web applications are also subject to additional controls, if they are public 
facing, to address ongoing threats and vulnerabilities after implementation, as defined at PCI 
DSS Requirement 6.6. 
 
6.3.7.a Obtain and review policies to confirm all custom application code changes for 
internal applications must be reviewed (either using manual or automated processes), as 
follows: 
 
• Code changes are reviewed by individuals other then the originating code author, and 
by individuals who are knowledgeable in code review techniques and secure coding 
practices. 
•  Appropriate corrections are implemented prior to release. 
•  Code review results are reviewed and approved by management prior to release. 
6.3.7.b Obtain and review policies to confirm that all custom application code changes for web 
applications must be reviewed (using either manual or automated processes) as follows: 
 
•  Code changes are reviewed by individuals other then the originating code author, and 
by individuals who are knowledgeable in code review techniques and secure coding 
practices. 
•  Code reviews ensure code is developed according to secure coding guidelines such as 
the Open Web Security Project Guide (see PCI DSS Requirement 6.5). 
•  Appropriate corrections are implemented prior to release. 
•  Code review results are reviewed and approved by management prior to release. 
6.3.7.c Select a sample of recent custom application changes and verify that custom application 
code is reviewed according to 6.3.7a and 6.3.7b above. 
 
6.4 Follow change control procedures for all changes to system components. 
 
6.4.a Obtain and examine company change-control procedures related to implementing 
security patches and software modifications, and verify that the procedures require items  
6.4.1 – 6.4.4 below. 
 
6.4.b For a sample of system components and recent changes/security patches, trace those 
changes back to related change control documentation. 
 
 
 
 
6.4.1 Documentation of impact 
 
6.4.1 Verify that documentation of customer impact is included in the change control 
documentation for each sampled change. 
 
6.4.2 Management sign-off by appropriate parties 
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6.4.2 Verify that management sign-off by appropriate parties is present for each 
sampled change. 
 
6.4.3 Testing of operational functionality 
 
6.4.3 Verify that operational functionality testing is performed for each sampled 
change. 
 
6.4.4 Back-out procedures 
 
6.4.4 Verify that back-out procedures are prepared for each sampled change 
 
6.5 Develop all web applications (internal and external, and including web administrative access to 
application) based on secure coding guidelines such as the Open Web Application Security Project 
Guide. Cover prevention of common coding vulnerabilities in software development processes, to 
include the following: Note: The vulnerabilities listed at 6.5.1 through 6.5.10 were current in the OWASP 
guide when PCI DSS v1.2 was published. However, if and when the OWASP guide is updated, the 
current version must be used for these requirements. 
 
6.5.a Obtain and review software development processes for any web-based applications. Verify 
that processes require training in secure coding techniques for developers, and are based on 
guidance such as the OWASP guide (http://www.owasp.org). 
 
6.5.b Interview a sample of developers and obtain evidence that they are knowledgeable in 
secure coding techniques. 
 
6.5.c Verify that processes are in place to ensure that web applications are not vulnerable to the 
following: 
 
6.5.1 Cross-site scripting (XSS) 
 
6.5.1 Cross-site scripting (XSS) (Validate all parameters before inclusion.) 
 
6.5.2 Injection flaws, particularly SQL injection. Also consider LDAP and Xpath injection flaws 
as well as other injection flaws. 
 
6.5.2 Injection flaws, particularly SQL injection (Validate input to verify user data 
cannot modify meaning of commands and queries.) 
 
6.5.3 Malicious file execution 
 
6.5.3 Malicious file execution (Validate input to verify application does not accept 
filenames or files from users.) 
 
6.5.4 Insecure direct object references 
 
6.5.4 Insecure direct object references (Do not expose internal object references to 
users.) 
6.5.5 Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) 
 
6.5.5 Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) (Do not reply on authorization credentials and 
tokens automatically submitted by browsers.) 
 
6.5.6 Information leakage and improper error handling 
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6.5.6 Information leakage and improper error handling.  (Do not leak information via 
error messages or other means.) 
 
6.5.7 Broken authentication and session management 
 
6.5.7 Broken authentication and session management (Properly authenticate users and 
protect account credentials and session tokens.) 
 
6.5.8 Insecure cryptographic storage  
 
6.5.8 Insecure cryptographic storage (Prevent cryptographic flaws.) 
 
6.5.9 Insecure communications  
 
6.5.9 Insecure communications (Properly encrypt all authenticated and sensitive 
communications.) 
 
6.5.10 Failure to restrict URL access  
 
6.5.10 Failure to restrict URL access (Consistently enforce access control in 
presentation layer and business logic for all URLs.) 
 
6.6 For public-facing web applications, address new threats and vulnerabilities on an ongoing basis and 
ensure these applications are protected against known attacks by either of the following methods: 
 
•  Reviewing public-facing web applications via manual or automated application 
vulnerability security assessment tools or methods, at least annually and after any 
changes 
•  Installing a web-application firewall in front of public-facing web applications 
6.6 For public-facing web applications, ensure that either one of the following methods are in 
place as follows: 
 
•  Verify that public-facing web applications are reviewed (using either manual or 
automated vulnerability security assessment tools or methods), as follows: 
 
- At least annually 
- After any changes 
- By an organization that specializes in application security 
- That all vulnerabilities are corrected 
- That the application is re-evaluated after the corrections 
 
•  Verify that a web-application firewall is in place in front of public-facing web 
applications to detect and prevent web-based attacks. Note: “An organization that 
specializes in application security” can be either a third-party company or an 
internal organization, as long as the reviewers specialize in application security and 
can demonstrate independence from the development team. 
7.1 Limit access to system components and cardholder data to only those individuals whose job requires 
such access. 
 
7.1 Obtain and examine written policy for data control, and verify that the policy. 
 
7.1.1 Restriction of access rights to privileged user IDs to least privileges necessary to 
perform job responsibilities 
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7.1.1 Confirm that access rights for privileged user IDs are restricted to least 
privileges necessary to perform job responsibilities. 
 
7.1.2 Assignment of privileges is based on individual personnel’s job classification and 
function 
7.1.2 Confirm that privileges are assigned to individuals based on job 
classification and function (also called “role-based access control” or RBAC). 
 
7.1.3 Requirement for an authorization form signed by management that specifies 
required privileges 
 
7.1.3 Confirm that an authorization form is required for all access, that it 
must specify required privileges, and that it must be signed by management. 
 
7.1.4 Implementation of an automated access control system 
 
7.1.4 Confirm that access controls are implemented via an automated access 
control system. 
 
7.2.1 Coverage of all system components 
 
7.2.1 Confirm that access control systems are in place on all system components. 
 
7.2.2 Assignment of privileges to individuals based on job classification and function 
 
7.2.2 Confirm that access control systems are configured to enforce privileges 
assigned to individuals based on job classification and function. 
 
7.2.3 Default “deny-all” setting  
 
7.2.3 Confirm that the access control systems has a default “deny-all” setting. Note: 
Some access control systems are set by default to “allow-all,” thereby permitting 
access unless/until a rule is written to specifically deny it. 
 
10.1 Establish a process for linking all access to system components (especially access done with 
administrative privileges such as root) to each individual user. 
 
10.1 Verify through observation and interviewing the system administrator, that audit trails 
are enabled and active for system components. 
 
10.2 Implement automated audit trails for all system components to reconstruct the following events: 
 
10.2.1 All individual accesses to cardholder data 
10.2.1 Verify all individual access to cardholder data is logged. 
 
10.2.2 All actions taken by any individual with root or administrative privileges 
 
10.2.2 Verify actions taken by any individual with root or administrative privileges is 
logged. 
 
10.2.3 Access to all audit trails  
 
10.2.3 Verify access to all audit trails is logged. 
 
10.2.4 Invalid logical access attempts  
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10.2.4 Verify invalid logical access attempts are logged. 
 
10.2 5 Use of identification and authentication mechanisms 
 
10.2.5 Verify use of identification and authentication mechanisms is logged. 
 
10.2.6 Initialization of the audit logs  
 
10.2.6 Verify initialization of audit logs is logged. 
 
10.2.7 Creation and deletion of system-level objects 
 
10.2.7 Verify creation and deletion of system level objects are logged. 
 
10.3 Record at least the following audit trail entries for all system components for each event: 
 
10.3.1 User identification  
 
10.3.1 Verify user identification is included in log entries. 
 
10.3.2 Type of event  
 
10.3.2 Verify type of event is included in log entries. 
 
10.3.3 Date and time  
 
10.3.3 Verify date and time stamp is included in log entries. 
 
10.3.4 Success or failure indication  
 
10.3.4 Verify success or failure indication is included in log entries. 
 
10.3.5 Origination of event  
 
10.3.5 Verify origination of event is included in log entries. 
 
10.3.6 Identity or name of affected data, system component, or resource 
 
10.3.6 Verify identity or name of affected data, system component, or resources is 
included in log entries. 
 
10.4 Synchronize all critical system clocks and times. 
10.4 Obtain and review the process for acquiring and distributing the correct time within the 
organization, as well as the time-related system-parameter settings for a sample of system 
components. 
 
10.4.a Verify that a known, stable version of NTP (Network Time Protocol) or similar 
technology, kept current per PCI DSS Requirements 6.1 and 6.2, is used for time 
synchronization. 
 
10.4.b Verify that internal servers are not all receiving time signals from external 
sources. [Two or three central time servers within the organization receive external 
time signals [directly from a special radio, GPS satellites, or other external sources 
based on International Atomic Time and UTC (formerly GMT)], peer with each other 
to keep accurate time, and share the time with other internal servers.] 
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10.4.c Verify that specific external hosts are designated from which the timeservers 
will accept NTP time updates (to prevent a malicious individual from changing the 
clock). Optionally, those updates can be encrypted with a symmetric key, and access 
control lists can be created that specify the IP addresses of client machines that will be 
provided with the NTP service (to prevent unauthorized use of internal time servers). 
See www.ntp.org for more information 
 
10.5 Secure audit trails so they cannot be altered. 
 
10.5.1 Limit viewing of audit trails to those with a job-related need. 
 
10.5.1 Verify that only individuals who have a job related need can view audit trail 
files. 
 
10.5.2 Protect audit trail files from unauthorized modifications. 
 
10.5.2 Verify that current audit trail files are protected from unauthorized 
modifications via access control mechanisms, physical segregation, and/or network 
segregation. 
 
10.5.3 Promptly back up audit trail files to a centralized log server or media that is difficult to 
alter. 
10.5.3 Verify that current audit trail files are promptly backed up to a centralized log 
server or media that is difficult to alter. 
 
10.5.4 Write logs for external-facing technologies onto a log server on the internal LAN. 
 
10.5.4 Verify that logs for external-facing technologies (for example, wireless, 
firewalls, DNS, mail) are offloaded or copied onto a secure centralized internal log 
server or media. 
 
10.5.5 Use file-integrity monitoring or change-detection software on logs to ensure that 
existing log data cannot be changed without generating alerts (although new data being added 
should not cause an alert). 
 
10.5.5 Verify the use of file-integrity monitoring or change-detection software for logs 
by examining system settings and monitored files and results from monitoring 
activities. 
 
10.6 Review logs for all system components at least daily. Log reviews must include those servers that 
perform security functions like intrusion-detection system (IDS) and authentication, authorization, and 
accounting protocol (AAA) servers (for example, RADIUS). Note: Log harvesting, parsing, and alerting 
tools may be used to meet compliance with Requirement 10.6 
 
10.6.a Obtain and examine security policies and procedures to verify that they include 
procedures to review security logs at least daily and that follow-up to exceptions is required. 
 
10.6.b Through observation and interviews, verify that regular log reviews are performed for 
all system components. 
 
10.7 Retain audit trail history for at least one year, with a minimum of three months immediately 
available for analysis (for example, online, archived, or restorable from back-up). 
 
10.7.a Obtain and examine security policies and procedures and verify that they include audit 
log retention policies and require audit log retention for at least one year. 
Yudit María 
  MS NSSA Final Project 
71   
 
 
 
10.7.b Verify that audit logs are available for at least one year and processes are in place to 
restore at least the last three months’ logs for immediate analysis. 
 
11.1 Test for the presence of wireless access points by using a wireless analyzer at least quarterly or 
deploying a wireless IDS/IPS to identify all wireless devices in use. 
 
11.1.a Verify that a wireless analyzer is used at least quarterly, or that a wireless IDS/IPS is 
implemented and configured to identify all wireless devices. 
 
11.1.b If a wireless IDS/IPS is implemented, verify the configuration will generate alerts to 
personnel. 
 
11.1 c Verify the organization’s Incident Response Plan (Requirement 12.9) includes a 
response in the event unauthorized wireless devices are detected. 
 
11.2 Run internal and external network vulnerability scans at least quarterly and after any significant 
change in the network (such as new system component installations, changes in network topology, 
firewall rule modifications, product upgrades). Note: Quarterly external vulnerability scans must be 
performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) qualified by Payment Card Industry Security 
Standards Council (PCI SSC).  Scans conducted after network changes may be performed by the 
company’s internal staff. 
 
11.2.a Inspect output from the most recent four quarters of internal network, host, and 
application vulnerability scans to verify that periodic security testing of the devices within the 
cardholder data environment occurs. Verify that the scan process includes rescans until passing 
results are obtained. Note: External scans conducted after network changes, and internal scans, 
may be performed by the company’s qualified internal personnel or third parties. 
 
11.2.b Verify that external scanning is occurring on a quarterly basis in accordance with the PCI 
Security Scanning Procedures, by inspecting output from the four most recent quarters of 
external vulnerability scans to verify that: 
 
  Four quarterly scans occurred in the most recent 12-month period; 
  The results of each scan satisfy the PCI Security Scanning Procedures (for example, 
no urgent, critical, or high vulnerabilities); 
  The scans were completed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) qualified by PCI 
SSC. Note: It is not required that four passing quarterly scans must be completed for 
initial PCI DSS compliance if the assessor verifies 1) the most recent scan result was a 
passing scan, 2) the entity has documented policies and procedures requiring 
quarterly scanning, and 3) vulnerabilities noted in the scan results have been 
corrected as shown in a re-scan. For subsequent years after the initial PCI DSS 
review, four passing quarterly scans must have occurred. 
11.2.c Verify that internal and/or external scanning is performed after any significant change 
in the network, by inspecting scan results for the last year. Verify that the scan process 
includes rescans until passing results are obtained. 
 
11.3 Perform external and internal penetration testing at least once a year and after any significant 
infrastructure or application upgrade or modification (such as an operating system upgrade, a 
subnetwork added to the environment, or a web server added to the environment). 
 
11.3.a Obtain and examine the results from the most recent penetration test to verify that 
penetration testing is performed at least annually and after any significant changes to the 
environment. Verify that noted vulnerabilities were corrected and testing repeated. 
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11.3.b Verify that the test was performed by a qualified internal resource or qualified external 
third party, and if applicable, organizational independence of the tester exists (not required to 
be a QSA or ASV). 
 
11.3.1 Network-layer penetration tests 
 
11.3.1 Verify that the penetration test includes network layer penetration tests. These tests 
should include components that support network functions as well as operating systems. 
 
11.3.2 Application-layer penetration tests 
 
11.3.2 Verify that the penetration test includes application-layer penetration tests. For web 
applications, the tests should include, at a minimum, the vulnerabilities listed in Requirement 
6.5. 
 
11.4 Use intrusion-detection systems, and/or intrusion-prevention systems to monitor all traffic in the 
cardholder data environment and alert personnel to suspected compromises. Keep all intrusion-
detection and prevention engines up-to-date. 
 
11.4.a Verify the use of intrusion-detection systems and/or intrusion-prevention systems and 
that all traffic in the cardholder data environment is monitored. 
 
11.4.b Confirm IDS and/or IPS are configured to alert personnel of suspected compromises. 
 
11.4.c Examine IDS/IPS configurations and confirm IDS/IPS devices are configured, 
maintained, and updated per vendor instructions to ensure optimal protection. 
 
11.5 Deploy file-integrity monitoring software to alert personnel to unauthorized modification of critical 
system files, configuration files, or content files; and configure the software to perform critical file 
comparisons at least weekly. Note: For file-integrity monitoring purposes, critical files are usually those 
that do not regularly change, but the modification of which could indicate a system compromise or risk 
of compromise. File-integrity monitoring products usually come pre-configured with critical files for the 
related operating system. Other critical files, such as those for custom applications, must be evaluated 
and defined by the entity (that is, the merchant or service provider). 
 
11.5 Verify the use of file-integrity monitoring products within the cardholder data 
environment by observing system settings and monitored files, as well as review in results 
from monitoring activities. Examples of files that should be monitored: 
  System executables 
  Application executables 
  Configuration and parameter files 
  Centrally stored, historical or archived, log and audit files 
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Appendix B 
 
Application 
Name 
Application 
Type  
Criticality Comments Card 
Related 
APP01 CMR Extremely 
critical 
Complete, integrated solution for 
CRM (Managing Customer 
Relations), optimization and 
business intelligence. It is a 
powerful Internet-based solution 
for companies that aim to 
increase sales, improve customer 
relationships, generate higher 
incomes and greater retention. 
Using personalized portals and 
roles-based, provides easy 
scalability and high performance. 
X 
APP02 GPN  Solution Business Process 
Management (NSG) which 
includes the management, 
monitoring, control and analysis 
procedures. We currently have 
automated processes and 
approvals for credit applications, 
application flow and 
administrative payments 
X 
APP03 IVR, CTI and 
Smart Dialer 
Extremely 
critical Contact Center Management 
X 
APP05  Extremely 
critical 
Financial System that manages, 
processes, authorizing 
transactions with Prepaid Cards 
X 
APP06 
 
Extremely 
critical Solution packages that cover all 
business areas of financial sector 
in a comprehensive way 
X 
APP07 Mail, Calendar   X 
APP08  Extremely 
critical 
Wrapped 
management 
system and 
validation of 
information 
security Credit 
Card 
X 
APP09     
APP10   Management System for Loyalty 
Programs 
X 
APP11    X 
APP12   Corporate solution for electronic 
document management, such as 
document management, 
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workflow, images and any type of 
electronic document in a single 
web-based application. 
APP13   Integrated Application System for 
the Administration Online 
Accounting 
 
APP14 Web publishing Extremely 
critical 
A system that allows customers 
to connect to the Bank for 
financial services without the 
need to visit any of our branches 
X 
APP15 Web publishing  Internet banking manager  
APP16    X 
APP17     X 
APP18   Management system that allows 
electronic transfer of Interbank 
X 
APP19   Corporate finance, banking, 
managed funds and risk 
management 
 
APP20   Management system and 
sending customizable by an end 
user or departmental 
 
APP21 
  
System for Human Resource 
Management, Payroll and Staff 
Training  
APP22 
 
Extremely 
critical 
 Is a fully comprehensive EFT 
switching system for banks and 
retailers to manage their self-
service systems with a united 
delivery channel. Its layered and 
extensible architecture enables 
the future development of the 
bank's business. By setting up a 
united system interface for 
various service delivery 
channels, can be integrated 
seamlessly with various systems 
such as core banking systems, 
card management systems and 
third-party switching systems. X 
APP23 
  
Manage automatically monitoring 
the compliance requirements 
related to the requirements of the 
departments of the Bank, 
established by laws, regulations, 
administrative provisions, state 
regulatory agencies  
APP24 Web publishing  Internal communication to keep 
employees informed about news 
of interest 
 
APP25  Extremely 
critical 
Financial System that manages, 
processes, transactions 
Authorizes Credit Card Collection 
and Management 
X 
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APP26   System for managing the 
operations of the Stock 
Exchange 
 
APP27   Recording System Customer 
Surveys to measure satisfaction 
with products and services we 
have in the bank 
 
APP28   Based system that serves as 
Business Development program 
that allows to monitor and assess 
the growth and performance of 
business executives, as well as 
showcase the achievements of 
the goals set for each 
 
APP29   A system that aims to present the 
results of the efforts made by 
business executives, in addition 
to displaying performance 
statistics, trends, and it supports 
decision-making in the 
organization 
 
APP30    System monitoring and 
preventing fraud through 
electronic transactions 
X 
APP31   System used for the operation of 
ATMs 
X 
APP32   A system that lets you create, 
publish and collect the results of 
an online survey 
 
APP33   Delivery system of accounts and 
credit cards by email 
X 
APP34   E-mail marketing software for 
managing your mailing list 
 
APP35 Backup  * Processes Card Information but 
does not stores it. Just processes 
the Backup data. 
X 
 
 
 
 
